
How will China respond to the incoming US administration? Recent discussions in Shanghai provide some insight into what’s likely to be on the table, writes Jason Young.
Comment: China’s think-tanks have been busy of late. Since June, they’ve been charged with predicting the outcome of the US presidential election, analysing what it could mean for China, and preparing briefs for the leadership on how it should approach the new administration come January.
On the first question, most predictions in China were for a Trump victory. Many scholars echoed the Fox News critique of the Democratic Party as ‘typical out-of-touch liberals’, instinctively understanding the rightward turn in US politics and correctly gauging the mood of the nation.
On the second question, the view of most scholars was that the new administration means one of two things for China. It will either be bad, or it will be really bad, hence the early prep.
Many scholars argued the incoming administration would not just be an aberration but would instead mark a fundamental shift in US foreign and domestic policy.
This was framed as part of the turbulent shift toward a multipolar order and, to steal a phrase from China, a new era of international politics.
Few spoke of being able to cut a deal. Many hoped for a cooperative relationship, which is the official position, but there was little confidence this would be possible.
On the question of how to respond, the think-tanks were exploring how China can navigate probable tariffs, loose rhetoric, and unpredictable shifts in policy toward China.
Many noted the US had already changed its assessments of and policy toward China, framing China as a peer competitor or a reemergent power, or talking about a shifting balance of power. These scholars expected to see further changes in US policy to try to reverse this trend.
There was widespread concern that the new administration would damage Chinese interests and seek to hobble Chinese growth. They put forth a range of measures to protect Chinese interests.
First, China would likely double its efforts in multilateral institutions. A potential US retreat from the United Nations, climate pacts, and the World Trade Organization was viewed by scholars as an opportunity for China to seize the initiative in these organisations.
China’s ideas for reforming global governance will present challenges for many countries. China’s proposals are generally illiberal, sympathetic to the security interests of authoritarian regimes such as Russia, and promote a shift in influence from West to East and from North to South.
New Zealand will need to invest a lot more in understanding these moves and forming coalitions of countries to defend rules and interests in multilateral fora as well as finding areas of cooperation with China where it can.